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This study benefited immensely from the interviews I conducted with six individuals
each of whom has had some measure of involvement in developing the Spanish law of
assisted reproduction. Marcelo Palacios, President and Founder of the International Society of
Bioethics, is the physician and former member of the Spanish Parliament who was in charge
of developing and drafting the 1988 law. Pedro Barri, director of the Department of
Obstetrics, Gynecology and Reproduction at USP Institut Universitari Dexeus, and Anna
Veiga, director of the Stem Cell Bank at the Center of Regenerative Medicine of Barcelona
and Chairman of the European Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology, are
physicians who oversaw the birth of the first IVF baby in Spain in 1984. Roberto Matorras,
former President of the Spanish Fertility Society, heads the Human Reproduction Unit at the
Hospital de Cruces, where the birth of the first IVF baby in the Spanish public health system
took place in 1985. Jaime Vidal is a professor of law at the University of Valencia who has
been writing on the implications of Spanish law for new reproductive technologies since the
advent of IVF. Carlos Romeo directs the Interuniversity Chair in Law and the Human Genome
at the University of Deusto and has been involved at several stages of the development of
various bioethics laws in Spain.
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assisted reproduction around the world. This paper examines why two
countries with similar histories of allegiance to Roman Catholicism have
developed highly divergent legal regimes to regulate assisted reproduction.
Italy has enacted one of the most restrictive regimes known, Spain one of the
most permissive. The comparative analysis employed here will afford insight
into how the development of legislative responses to assisted reproduction
correlate with religious commitments, feminist sentiment and the regulation
of abortion.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Looking back on early work in the regulation of assisted reproductive
technology (ART), one is struck by how far our reactions to reproductive
technology have come since the decades leading up to the birth of the first in
vitro fertilization (IVF) baby in 1978. No longer does IVF provoke the
“futuristic fantasies and . . . doom-laden scenarios”1 that populate the textual
representations of reproductive technology of the 1920s and 1930s. In that
long-ago era when most reproductive technology remained in the realm of
speculation, there was plenty of hope that reproductive technology would be
liberatory. At the same time, these flights of fancy fueled anxiety about what
scientific intervention into human reproduction would mean for the future.2
1. MARILYN STRATHERN, REPRODUCING THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON ANTHROPOLOGY,
KINSHIP, AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 5 (1992).
2. SUSAN MERRILL SQUIER, BABIES IN BOTTLES: TWENTIETH-CENTURY VISIONS OF
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 2–4 (1994); see also ROBIN MARANTZ HENIG, PANDORA’S BABY:
HOW THE FIRST TEST TUBE BABIES SPARKED THE REPRODUCTIVE REVOLUTION 15 (2004) (“[I]n
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That future is now, and through contemporary eyes looks comparatively
bland: “IVF is no longer monstrous; today it is almost mundane.”3 This was
not the case in the wake of the birth of Louise Brown, however, as European
governments grappled with the possibility that assisted reproduction would
have to be curbed, or at the very least subjected to strict guidelines, lest
unregulated scientific experimentation in the realm of human reproduction
collide with important societal interests and fan the flames of collective fear
and panic.
It is well understood that the task of drafting laws to govern assisted
reproduction places lawmakers in the unenviable position of attempting to
strike a balance between the individual right to procreate and majoritarian
convictions relating to responsible reproductive practices and parenting.
European legislatures have placed several considerations in the balance,
including the status of the embryo, the best interests of the child,
reproductive autonomy, and the exploitation of women by technology. A
legislature’s views on these issues tend to influence the relative
permissiveness or restrictiveness of the resulting law. Some countries prize a
genetic connection in parent-child relationships so highly that only
techniques that employ the intending parents’ gametes are permitted. This
narrow view of what constitutes a healthy family life results in tight controls
on access to assisted reproduction. Countries with a less constrained view of
the possibilities for organizing family life believe strong commitments to
both individual autonomy and child welfare are compatible. Under this view,
access to assisted reproduction is not limited to heterosexual couples but may
extend to gay and lesbian couples and single individuals.
In addition to the impact family formation policies have on the welfare
of children, beliefs about the status of the embryo are often raised in defense
of or in opposition to the different ways ART might be regulated. The belief
that embryos are human beings is most closely associated with restrictions on
assisted reproduction, whether in the form of an outright ban on IVF, as in
Costa Rica,4 or, as in Italy, a mandate that no embryo be subjected to preimplantation genetic diagnosis, donated to science, or destroyed. A belief
the years before the first test tube baby . . . reasonable men and women . . . sincerely believed
that IVF might unleash a scourge of woeful possibilities . . . .”); Bernard Rubin, Psychological
Aspects of Human Artificial Insemination, 13 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 121 (1965).
3. HENIG, supra note 2, at 233.
4. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has determined that the ban
violates the American Convention on Human Rights and has submitted the matter to the InterAmerican Court on Human Rights. http://www.cidh.oas.org/demandas/12.361Eng.pdf (July
29, 2011).
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that embryos are not due quite so much respect tends to vest decision-making
control in the intending parents, whether they are using their own gametes in
the process or have procured the gametes of third parties.
These issues were foremost in the minds of the drafters of the earliest
legislative regimes governing assisted reproduction in Europe, where today
we find a dizzying patchwork of differing laws. Within this patchwork, Italy
and Spain, both countries with similar histories of allegiance to the Roman
Catholic Church, stand out—Italy for its restrictive stance and Spain for its
permissiveness. Ethicists react with equal alarm to restrictiveness and
permissiveness, but there has been widespread attention paid only to the
restrictive law Italy enacted in 2004.5 The Spanish approach to regulation6
has either been ignored,7 oversimplified,8 or subjected to cursory analysis.9
Notable, if not numerous, exceptions to these general trends do exist,10 but
the trend itself is unfortunate primarily because there is in Spain a rich
literature and an ongoing dialogue on bioethical issues generally and on
assisted reproduction in particular.11 This literature is not very well known
outside of Spain, however. In a recent issue of Cambridge Quarterly of
Healthcare Ethics, Cornell University Professor of Medical Ethics Pablo
Rodríguez del Pozo commented: “The dissemination of ideas from the
Spanish-speaking world has been nearly invisible to the English-speaking
world of bioethics, isolated by language and culture from intellectual

5. Legge 19 febbraio 2004, n.40, in G.U. 24 febbraio 2004, n.45 (It.), available at
http://www.camera.it/parlam/leggi/04040l.htm.
6. Sobre Técnicas de Reproducción Humana Asistida (B.O.E. 2006, 9292), available
at http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2006/05/27/pdfs/A19947-19956.pdf.
7. E.g., THIRD PARTY ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACROSS CULTURES: SOCIAL, LEGAL AND
ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES (Eric Blyth & Ruth Landau eds., 2004).
8. E.g., Antonio Pellicer, The Italian Law on Assisted Reproduction: A View from
Spain, 11 REPRODUCTIVE BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 660 (2005).
9. E.g., Jaime Vidal Martínez, The Legal Situation of Assisted Reproduction in Spain,
in CREATING THE CHILD: THE ETHICS, LAW AND PRACTICE OF ASSISTED PROCREATION 287
(Donald Evans ed., 1996).
10. E.g., Julien Dubouchet & Ulrich Klöti, ART in Spain: Technocratic Inheritance and
Modernist Aspirations, in COMPARATIVE BIOMEDICAL POLICY: GOVERNING ASSISTED
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (Ivar Bleiklie et al. eds., 2004); José-Javier Hualde-Sanchez &
Itziar Alkorta Idiaquez, Génétique et procréations assistées en Espagne, in BIOMEDICINE, THE
FAMILY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 221 (Marie-Thérèse Meulders-Klein et al. eds., 2002).
11. In this connection, consider activities of the Interuniversity Network on Law and the
Human Genome at the University of Deusto, available at http://www.catedraderechoygenoma
humano.es/revista_consejo.asp, and the UNESCO-sponsored Bioethics and Law Observatory
at the University of Barcelona, http://www.pcb.ub.es/bioeticaidret/index.php?lang=es_ES.
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currents abroad.”12 In some measure, then, this study seeks to remedy this
isolation by bringing Spanish perspectives into the English-language
discussion of biomedical regulation.
Scholarship on the regulation of assisted reproduction tends to be
country-specific. It does not, in most cases, make connections between
countries with alternative approaches to regulation. Exceptions do exist,13 but
even studies that purport to be comparative often simply present highly
detailed and discrete descriptions of each jurisdiction’s legislative regime.
They may even develop a taxonomy for categorizing the different degrees of
regulation14 but nonetheless leave common themes and explanations of these
differences unexplored. What is most notable is that these studies often lack
any description of the legislative process that led to the legislation in
question. This “ocean of country-specific details that usually characterizes
cross-national empirical studies”15 is nonetheless a helpful point of departure
for embarking on policy analysis in a more comparative vein. The bioethics
literature on assisted reproduction is a useful complement to the countryspecific studies, approaching the topic as it does through the lens of universal
philosophical principles. Its major shortcoming, though, from the point of
view of comparative policy analysis, is its lack of engagement with theories
of legislation and the realities of the political process. In other words,
bioethics seems often to ignore that what seems normatively correct may not
be politically achievable. In an attempt to address the gap in comparative
policy analysis on the regulation of ART, this article focuses on the
legislative processes that have led to statutory enactments on assisted
reproduction in two historically Catholic countries. This approach to the
question of regulation will help elucidate the influence of physicians, the
Roman Catholic Church, the feminist movement and the issue of abortion on
the regulations that were ultimately enacted in Italy and Spain and how those
influences might manifest themselves in debates over legislation that may
one day be considered in the United States.
12. Pablo Rodriguez Del Pozo & Joseph J. Fins, Guest Editorial: The Many Voices of
Spanish Bioethics – An Introduction, 18 CAMBRIDGE Q. OF HEALTHCARE ETHICS 214, 214
(2009).
13. E.g., Bill Atkin, Regulation of Assisted Human Reproduction: The Recent New
Zealand Model in Comparison with Other Systems, 11 REVUE JURIDIQUE POLYNÉSIENNE 81
(2005).
14. E.g., Linda Nielsen, Legal Consensus and Divergence in Europe in the Area of
Assisted Conception—Room for Harmonisation?, in CREATING THE CHILD, supra note 9, at
305, 306.
15. Jan W. van Deth, Series Editor’s Preface, in COMPARATIVE BIOMEDICAL POLICY,
supra note 10, at xiii.
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II. THERAPEUTIC CULTURES AND BIOMEDICAL REGULATION IN EUROPE
In contrast to the majority of countries,16 all countries in Europe have
comprehensive legislative schemes governing assisted reproduction. The
prevalence of legislation in this part of the world may be due to the
prevailing sentiment that it is inconceivable in Europe that the public would
not insist on regulation of something as monumental as the new reproductive
technologies.17
But the question of regulating in this area did not simply arise with the
birth of the first child conceived using IVF. It had already been proceeding
with regard to alternative insemination for some time. By the 1960s,
alternative insemination had become relatively familiar.18 From the mid1970s and into the early 1980s, judicial decisions and, later, legislation began
to appear regarding the legality of,19 the legal requirements for,20 and the
legal ramifications of alternative insemination.21
16. According to the International Federation of Fertility Societies’ most recent
Surveillance, assisted reproduction is governed by legislation in approximately 40 % of the
countries surveyed. Howard W. Jones, Ian Cooke et al., Surveillance 2010 (2011), INT’L
FED’N FERTILITY SOCIETIES, http://www.iffs-reproduction.org/documents/IFFS_Surveillance
_2010.pdf, at 10.
17. Jacinto Gil Rodriguez, Prologue, ITZIAR ALKORTA IDIAKEZ, REGULACIÓN JURÍDICA
DE LA MEDICINA REPRODUCTIVA: DERECHO ESPAÑOL Y COMPARADO 19 (2003) (describing this
insistence as “la compulsa del necesario control público de los nuevos métodos de
procreación, habida cuenta de la necesario conjugación entre las elecciones individuales, la
garantía científica y la trascendencia social de las singulares biotecnologías que, en cada caso,
pretenden activarse.”).
18. Charles P. Kindregan Jr., Thinking About the Law of Assisted Reproductive
Technology, 27 WIS. J. FAM. L. 123 (2007).
19. 360 Other Laws Affecting Parents and Children, 10 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 175,
175 (1983) (noting that French Minister of Justice declares artificial insemination not legally
prohibited).
20. Legitimacy of Children, 1977 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 53 (1977) (noting that
Yugoslavia bars payment to sperm donors); Fertility Regulation: Sterilization, 1978 ANN.
REV. POPULATION L. 12 (1978); Other Laws Affecting Parents and Children, 9 ANN. REV.
POPULATION L. 155–57 (1982) (explaining comprehensive regulations promulgated in
Czechoslovakia); 360 Other Laws Affecting Parents and Children, 9 ANN. REV. POPULATION
L. 158 (1982) (explaining Hungarian Ministry of Health ordinance and obstetrics,
gynaecology and urology societies’ circular governing “the selection and examination of
donors and recipients for artificial insemination”); Other Laws Affecting Parents and
Children, 11 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 133 (1984) (citing Sweden’s Insemination Act).
21. Filiation: Legitimacy of Children, 1976 ANN. REV. POPULATION L.105–06 (1976)
(explaining that a French court ruled husband could renounce his paternity even if he had
consented to his wife’s medical insemination by donor); Filiation of Children, 1980 ANN.
REV. POPULATION L. 168 (1980) (noting the law in Yugoslavia); Other Laws Affecting Parents
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After the birth of Louise Brown in the United Kingdom in 1978,
various European groups and the governments of Victoria and Queensland,
Australia, began studying what social repercussions the use of assisted
reproductive techniques might have.22 That same year, India became the
second country to have a successful IVF birth,23 followed by Australia in
1980.24 Australia built upon this success with, all in 1984, the world’s first
IVF quadruplets, the first IVF birth using a donor egg, the first IVF birth
using a donor embryo, and the first IVF birth using a frozen embryo. In
1986, the first IVF birth using a frozen egg occurred in Adelaide.25 As of
and Children, 9 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 154–55 (1982) (noting the law in Czechoslovakia);
Other Laws Affecting Parents and Children, 11 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 134 (1984) (noting
the law in Sweden); M. Mandofia & M. Buergisser, Les Difficultés de Réglementer la
Procréation Assistée, 13 DÉVIANCE ET SOCIÉTÉ 257, 258 (1989). Such laws coincided with the
enactment of such laws in the individual U.S. states and the Canadian provinces. Legitimacy
of Children, 1976 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 114–16 (1976) (noting the law in Connecticut);
Rights of Spouses Within Marriage, 9 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 95 (1982) (noting the law in
Quebec). Legitimacy of Birth: Filiation of Children, 9 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 152 (1982)
(noting a South African court determines child born via artificial insemination to be
illegitimate); Other Laws Affecting Parents and Children, 10 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 175–
76 (1983) (noting a German court determined husband within certain period of time after birth
could challenge legitimacy of child born to his wife via AID and with his consent); K.,
Stoyanovich, Adultery: La Légitimité des Enfants Nés par Suite de L’Insemination Artificielle,
en France et aux Etats-Unis d’Amérique, 8 REVUE INERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARÉ 264,
267–68, 270–71 (1956); Insurance: Other Laws Affecting Parents and Children, 8 ANN. REV.
POPULATION L. 188 (1981) (noting the laws in France); Other Laws Affecting Parents and
Children, 10 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 176–77 (1983) (noting the laws in Germany).
22. JOSÉ ANTONIO COBACHO GÓMEZ & JUAN JOSÉ INIESTA DELGADO, COMENTARIOS A
LA LEY 14/2006, DE 26 MAYO, SOBRE TÉCNICAS DE REPRODUCCIÓN HUMANA ASISTIDA (2007);
Anita Stuhmcke, The Criminal Act of Commercial Surrogacy in Australia: A Call for Review,
18 J.L. MED. 601, 603 (2011).
23. T.C. Anand Kumar, Advent of Medically Assisted Reproductive Technologies
(MART) in India, in THE ART AND SCIENCE OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNIQUES (ART) 3,
3-4 (Gautam Allahbadia & Rita Basuray eds., 2004); Siddhartha Chatterjee, Prof. Robert
Edwards, Nobel Laureate in Medicine 2010—Tribute of an Indian with Joy and Sorrow, 4 AL
AMEEN J. MED. SCI. 1, 1 (2011).
24. BART FAUSER & PAUL DEVROEY, BABY-MAKING: WHAT THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE
TREATMENTS MEAN FOR FAMILIES AND SOCIETY 10-11 (2011); Une Histoire de Quarante Ans,
LE MONDE, Jan. 20, 1996.
25. Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, Australian Inquiries Binder
3 (1991). National Library and Archives Canada, RG 33-154, accession no. 1993-94/531, Box
23, file no. 2500-3-2. The birth of multiples might not be considered a success today, given
the widespread awareness of the threats to women’s and children’s health that arise in cases of
multiple gestation. European Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology Task Force on
Ethics and Law, Ethical Issues Related to Multiple Pregnancies in Medically Assisted
Reproduction, 18 HUM. REPROD. 1976, 1977 (2003).
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1991, Australia had engaged in more governmental inquiries into assisted
reproduction techniques than any other country per capita.26
Britain established the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation
and Embryology in 1982, also known as the Warnock Committee, to study
the social, ethical and legal ramifications of assisted reproduction.27 In its
report, published in 1984, the Committee acknowledged that the anxiety and
moral indignation triggered by debates about these matters complicated its
task;28 however, it also found that no one was in favor of allowing
innovations in infertility treatment to develop without limits.29 Although the
committee believed existing law to be inadequate to the task of responding to
these new technologies, it nonetheless warned against regulating too rapidly
or too extensively given that scientific advancement and public opinion
would likely change briskly.30 The Warnock Report made several important
recommendations, including the need for a licensing agency to oversee the
practice of ART, that were later supported by the government31 and adopted
by Parliament in 1990.32 The Report was prescient in remarking that
“[d]ifferent countries are at different stages in the development both of
services and of a policy response. They have different cultural, moral and
legal traditions, influencing the way in which a problem is tackled and the
ways in which it might be resolved.”33
The first French, Swedish, and Austrian IVF births occurred in 1982, and
France’s consultative committee on the ethics of biosciences and health was
created shortly thereafter, in 1983.34 After years of debate, in 1994 France

26. Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, Australian Inquiries Binder
3 (1991). National Library and Archives Canada, RG 33-154, accession no. 1993-94/531,
Box 23, file no. 2500-3-2.
27. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & SOCIAL SECURITY, Report of the Committee of Inquiry
into Human Fertilisation and Embryology iv (1984) (U.K.).
28. Id. at 1.
29. Id. at 2.
30. Id. at 7.
31. Jacqueline A. Priest, Assisted Reproduction—Development in England, 37 INT’L &
COMP. L.Q. 535, 535 (1988).
32. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act of 1990. Note that the Surrogacy
Arrangements Act, banning commercial surrogacy, antedated the HFEA, having been enacted
in 1985. 12 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 326 (1985).
33. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & SOCIAL SECURITY, Report of the Committee of Inquiry
into Human Fertilisation and Embryology 6 (1984) (U.K.).
34. Une Histoire de Quarante Ans, supra note 24.
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promulgated its bioethics law, which was slated for reexamination in 199935
and revised in 2011.36
Victoria promulgated the first set of comprehensive laws regulating
assisted reproduction techniques in 1984.37 This act, the Infertility (Medical
Procedures) Act of 1984, gave only heterosexual couples access to in vitro
fertilization and permitted reimbursing gamete donors only to the extent of
their travel and medical expenses.38 The Act provided that intending parents
and donors were entitled to non-identifying information about each other
upon request, and that donors were entitled to non-identifying information
about the children born from the use of their gametes.39 The Act declared
surrogacy contracts to be void and attached criminal penalties to commercial
surrogacy and advertising related to surrogacy.40
By the late 1980s, a full-fledged policy discussion about the law and
ethics of assisted reproduction was underway in many European countries.
Norway passed a law in 1987 permitting only married couples to have access
to in vitro fertilization and requiring that they use their own gametes.41 Spain
and Sweden were next to pass comprehensive laws, both in 1988.42 Spain’s
law permitted all known assisted reproductive techniques—save surrogacy—
and did not restrict treatment to married couples. Although Sweden allowed
artificial insemination by donor,43 its law on in vitro fertilization permitted
only heterosexual couples to use their own gametes in any attempt at
“fertilization outside the human body.”44 Legislation in other countries
followed in rapid succession, including Germany (1991), Denmark (1992)
and Austria (1992).45 Many, albeit not all, of these legislative efforts of the
late 1980s fit, as Anita Stuhmcke has observed, a pattern of responding to
35. Id.
36. Le Projet de Loi Bioéthique Adopté, LE MONDE, June 2, 2011.
37. Other Laws Affecting Parents and Children and Child Welfare, 11 ANN. REV.
POPULATION L. 129, 130 (1984).
38. Appendices, 11 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 302, 443–59 (1984).
39. Id. at 454.
40. Id. at 458–59.
41. Appendix, 14 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 241, 358 (1987).
42. Sweden’s law came into force on January 1, 1989. JENNIFER GUNNING & VERONICA
ENGLISH, HUMAN IN VITRO FERTILIZATION: A CASE STUDY IN THE REGULATION OF MEDICAL
INNOVATION 164 (1993).
43. Assisted Reproduction Fertility Regulation, 14 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 51, 55
(1987).
44. Assisted Reproduction Fertility Regulation, 15 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 52, 58
(1988).
45. GUNNING & ENGLISH, supra note 42, at 147, 151, 154.
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biomedical developments “by initially applying the heavy-handed regulatory
model of the criminal law and then subsequently [adopting] more nuanced
and flexible regulatory frameworks.”46
European legislation on ART generally fits within one of three
classifications: (1) permissive; (2) cautious; and (3) prohibitive.47 Permissive
jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom and Spain exhibit tolerance toward
most well-known forms of assisted reproduction except commercial
surrogacy.48 These jurisdictions typically allow the use of third-party
gametes and embryos and do not limit access to assisted reproductive
technology based on marital status or sexual orientation. Research using
supernumerary embryos, the cloning of embryos for stem cell research, and
the selection of embryos with the aid of pre-implantation diagnosis is also
permitted in liberal jurisdictions.49 Cautious jurisdictions such as France and
Denmark do not have widespread restrictions but nonetheless have strict
rules requiring anonymity in gamete donation50 and bans on surrogacy.51
Cautious jurisdictions may allow pre-implantation genetic diagnosis
(“PGD”) of embryos only in special cases and may prohibit the creation of
embryos through in vitro fertilization or therapeutic cloning for research
purposes.52 Cautious jurisdictions may, however, permit research on embryos
that remain from couples who have completed their infertility treatment.53 In
addition to these restrictions on practice, France permits only stable
heterosexual couples to have access to assisted reproduction.54
The prohibitive approach stands in contrast to the liberal approach by
placing limits on embryo and stem cell research and embryo selection
following PGD.55 Many assisted reproduction laws in Europe contain
restrictions that impede some infertile couples and individuals from
46. Stuhmcke, supra note 22, at 605.
47. See Nielsen, supra note 14, at 306.
48. See generally H.W. Jones et al., IFFS Surveillance 2010, FERTILITY & STERILITY
13–14 (2010).
49. Frédéric Varone, Christine Rothmayr et al., Comparing Biotechnology Policy in
Europe and North America: A Theoretical Framework, in THE POLITICS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY
IN
NORTH AMERICA AND EUROPE: POLICY NETWORKS, INSTITUTIONS, AND
INTERNATIONALIZATION 1, 7, 9 (Eric Monpetit, Christine Rothmayr et al. eds., 2007)
[hereinafter THE POLITICS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY].
50. Jones et al., supra note 48, at 65. Israel is another country of this type. Id.
51. Id. at 109–10.
52. THE POLITICS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 49, at 9.
53. Id.
54. Jones et al., supra note 48, at 4.
55. THE POLITICS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 49, at 9.
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obtaining treatment in their home countries. The most common restrictions
bar participation by third-party gamete donors and surrogates in the
reproductive process, prohibit compensation of these third parties, or deny
gamete donors any right to remain anonymous. Prohibitive countries such as
Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and Italy also outlaw techniques that are
elsewhere embraced as mainstream procedures. In these jurisdictions, oocyte
donation is banned outright.56 Austria and Italy also prohibit sperm donation
in IVF.57 In addition to banning these forms of third-party gamete donation,
Switzerland prohibits PGD.58 It is joined in this restriction by several nonEuropean countries including Chile, China, Ivory Coast, and the
Philippines.59 Although it does not always require PGD, non-medical sex
selection is banned in the United Kingdom, India, Canada, and Taiwan.60
In general, restrictions on assisted reproduction aim to combat one or
more of several evils believed to emerge from the laissez-faire approach to
regulation: (1) the commodification of reproduction generally; (2)
psychological harm to children; (3) health risks to egg donors; and (4) the
danger to societal integrity posed by donor-created families. The restrictions
themselves take several forms, whether barring participation by third-party
gamete donors and surrogates in the reproductive process, prohibiting
compensation of these third parties, or denying gamete donors any right to
remain anonymous.
Despite the prevalence of legislation in Europe, Nielsen’s classification
scheme shows international disharmony. But even within individual
countries, European observers point out the difficulty of achieving internal
consensus on these questions that leads to complete coherence within any
given legislative scheme. As was remarked early on in the history of the
regulation of assisted reproduction in Europe, “[v]ery few countries achieve
an internal consensus on all issues surrounding medically assisted
conception, one that allows for a coherent and comprehensive national policy
or legislation.”61 Thus, what some perceive to be a patchwork of restrictions
across countries turns out to be a patchwork of restrictions within countries
as well.

56. Jones et al., supra note 48, at 47–48.
57. Id. at 46–48.
58. Id. at 100.
59. Id. at 101.
60. Id. at 95–96.
61. Bartha M. Knoppers & Sonia Lebris, Recent Advances in Medically Assisted
Conception: Legal, Ethical and Social Issues, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 329, 330–31 (1991).
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That European regulation of assisted reproduction is so varied can be
understood first and foremost as the natural outgrowth of the broad
competence of individual countries to regulate human reproduction and the
differing religious and moral values with which they do so. It is especially
important, then, to consider the therapeutic cultures that contribute so
significantly to the look and feel of whatever regulation ultimately comes
into force. I borrow this term from Arthur Daemmrich’s Pharmacopolitics,
which defines a therapeutic culture in the field of drug regulation as the
historical evolution of the often fraught relationships among of physicians,
government regulators, the pharmaceutical industry and pressure groups that
leads to particular regulation of pharmaceuticals.62 Daemmrich focuses on
the United States and Germany, two capitalist states with similar
technological advancement in, and governmental support for, medical
technology. But the cultures of medical care delivery in these two countries
differ sharply: in the United States it is a private good, in Germany a public
entitlement. These understandings about appropriate medical care delivery
are, of course, products of broader cultural beliefs and practices.
Daemmrich’s goal in approaching the question of drug regulation in this
fashion is to better understand the role of politics in medicine and, more
particularly, the politicization of drug testing and drug science.63 From a
wider perspective, delineating the therapeutic culture at work in any given
instance “indicates how health-care provision practices are shaped by
historical developments and interactions between different actors in the area
of health care, which have led to nationally specific constellations of healthcare provision.”64

62. ARTHUR A. DAEMMRICH, PHARMACOPOLITIC: DRUG REGULATION IN THE UNITED
STATES AND GERMANY, 4, 11 (2004). This use of the term is in contrast to its use in literature
on emotional health. E.g., Elaine Swan, “You Make Me Feel Like A Woman”: Therapeutic
Cultures and the Contagion of Femininity, 15 GEND. WORK & ORG. 88, 88 (2008) (defining
therapeutic culture as “the congeries of practices, meanings and values connected by the belief
that the psychological self, as opposed to the physical self, is the source of wellbeing.”);
Lisbet Borge and May Solveig Fagermoen, Patients’ Core Experiences of Hospital
Treatment: Wholeness and Self-Worth in Time and Space, 17 J. MENTAL HEALTH 193 (2008)
(reflecting on the optimal therapeutic environment in which to treat mental illness). It is also
in contrast to the work of social scientists writing on how a “therapeutic ethos” has pervaded
American society. E.g., JONATHAN B. IMBER, THERAPEUTIC CULTURE: TRIUMPH AND DEFEAT
(2004).
63. DAEMMRICH, supra note 62, at 5.
64. Erik Aarden et al., Providing Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis in the United
Kingdom: A Comparative In-depth Analysis of Health Care Access, 7 HUM. REPROD. 1542,
1543 (2009).
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Daemmrich’s generalizations about therapeutic cultures apply readily to
other areas of medical policy. “Intense debates and very serious differences
of opinion” are staples in policy debates on bioethical matters in particular,
with each cultural constituent striving to establish itself as the most
legitimate spokesperson or “obligatory ‘point of passage’” on questions of
regulation.65 This state of affairs is discernible not only with respect to drug
regulation but perhaps even more saliently in the regulation of assisted
reproduction where there is little room to deny that religious, moral and
cultural values play a prominent role in the formulation of policy.
III. THE CATHOLIC CHURCH’S INFLUENCE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The Roman Catholic Church is the dominant church in Latin countries
around the world, recalling its founding at Rome and its inclusion in the
colonial activities of the Romans and subsequently of the Spanish. Today,
the religion is predominant in Southern Europe and Latin America. The
Church claims 1.18 billion adherents66 with noticeable growth in Africa and
Asia.67 Projections indicate that the power base of the Church, already on the
wane in Europe in the wake of searing sex-abuse scandals, will reemerge in
the more loyal southern hemisphere by mid-century.68 Given the Church’s
predominance in many countries, it is more than capable of exerting an
influence on legislative matters.
The Church takes two positions that cause it to disapprove of abortion
and assisted reproduction. First, it is committed to protecting human life
from the point of conception.69 This means that it is morally opposed to
abortion as a matter of principle, although it does not condemn abortion in
cases of ectopic pregnancy. Second, a child must be the product of the sexual
union of a married heterosexual couple. This means that the Church is

65. DAEMMRICH, supra note 62, at 11.
66. Francis X. Rocca, Number of Catholics Worldwide Edges Up, Vatican Says, THE
CHRISTIAN CENTURY (Feb. 22, 2011), http://christiancentury.org/article/2011-02/numbercatholics-worldwide-edged-vatican-says.
67. Factfile: Roman Catholics Around the World, BRITISH BROADCASTING
CORPORATION (Jan. 1, 2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4243727.stm.
68. Philip Jenkins, The End of the European Church, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 29,
2010, available at http://www.npr.org/templates /story/story.php?storyId=126382767 (last
visited Mar. 30, 2011).
69. Joseph G. Schenker, Assisted Reproductive Practice: Religious Perspectives, 10
REPRODUCTIVE BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 310, 311 (2005).
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opposed to methods of human conception that do not involve sexual
intercourse, i.e., techniques of assisted reproduction.70
Both views are rooted in the idea of a communion of persons. Human
beings are made in God’s likeness to express love in “an all-encompassing
self-surrender for the sake of others.”71 This idea exists throughout Catholic
theology and is prominent in its tenets regarding the family and sexuality.
The familial communion of persons, defined as a married heterosexual
couple who choose each other forever, who engage in procreative sex only
within such a union and welcome all resulting children into the family, is the
most important communion of persons.72 Divorce, adultery, pre-marital sex,
abortion, contraception and assisted reproduction all undermine the family as
a community of persons.73 They are prohibited because they are acts of
selfishness that conflict with the “total self-donation of one person to
another” upon which the familial communion of persons is founded.74
The Catholic Church considers the use of ART a serious abuse that
destroys both love and life. ART is the product of a “contraceptive
mentality” that destroys love by reducing sexual intercourse to “a merely
biological function” and destroys life because it seeks to create children
without sexual intercourse.75 By using ART, the couple is “manipulating and
using their bodies” through a selfish desire for children.76 This is contrary to
God’s will and an affront to human dignity.77 “The practice of artificial
conception reduces procreation to a merely biological, laboratory act when it
must be, by God’s will, the fruit of a covenant, a communion of persons, as
expressed in the conjugal embrace of a man and a woman joined in
marriage.”78
The Church’s views on ART were published in the 1987 instruction
Donum Vitae, which specifically condemns the cryopreservation of embryos,
procreation outside of marriage, a married couple’s using donated gametes or

70. Id. at 311; Rachel Anne Fenton, Catholic Doctrine Versus Women’s Rights The New
Italian Law on Assisted Reproduction, 14 MED. L. REV. 73, 86 (2006).
71. RICHARD M. HOGAN & JOHN M. LEVOIR, COVENANT OF LOVE: POPE JOHN PAUL II ON
SEXUALITY, MARRIAGE, AND FAMILY IN THE MODERN WORLD 37 (1985).
72. Id. at 40.
73. Id. at 43–45, 46, 48–56.
74. Id. at 46, 60.
75. Id. at 56.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. (emphasis added).
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embryos to have children, and surrogacy.79 The instruction likewise
condemns techniques of assisted reproduction that permit a married couple to
contribute their own gametes and gestation to the process of creating a
child.80 The act of sexual intercourse is said to be essential to responsible
procreation.81
Donum Vitae is a political document. In direct contrast to the Church’s
stance in the early 1960s, when it sought “to distance itself from party
politics (especially in Italy) and concentrate more fully on its universal
spiritual and pastoral mission,”82 Donum Vitae urges legislatures to embrace
its dictates as a blueprint for regulation. In particular, the instruction
advocates provisions that vindicate the natural law concepts that lie behind
its list of condemned practices. Not to do so would violate inalienable rights
vested in each person by the Creator: the rights to life and integrity, the rights
to family and marriage, but perhaps most importantly the right of each child
to be created and raised by married heterosexual parents.83 As a response to
advances in biomedicine, Donum Vitae urges adherence to the teaching of
the Church as the only defense to humankind “against the excesses of [its]
own power.”84
A. Spain
Spain is a special case for the Catholic Church. Until the late 1960s, it
was the most conservative of all the other major Catholic countries.85 But
today, although 94.2 percent of the Spanish citizens are baptized Catholics,86
the country is increasingly secular. Spain’s shift to democracy after the death
of dictator Francisco Franco was accompanied by the increased separation of
church and state. At present, and even though it is nominally represented by
a strong opposition party, the Partido Popular, the Church simply has very
little influence in the legislature. Interest in the Church among young people
79. Donum Vitae, ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH—CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF
FAITH, 10, 12, 13, available at http://www.ewtn.com/library/curia/cdfhuman.htm
[hereinafter Donum Vitae].
80. Id. at 15–17.
81. Id. at 14–15.
82. CHRISTOPHER DUGGAN, A CONCISE HISTORY OF ITALY 266 (1994).
83. Donum Vitae, supra note 79, at 19.
84. Id. at 22.
85. STANLEY G. PAYNE, THE FRANCO REGIME, 1936–1975 at 560 (1987) [hereinafter
PAYNE, THE FRANCO REGIME].
86. The Largest Catholic Communities, http://www.adherents.com/largecom/com
_romcath.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2011).
THE
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in particular has plummeted fifty-six percent in the last ten years.87 In this
connection, commentators note that it is no accident that the corporatebacked World Youth Day 2011, one of the mechanisms by which the Church
hoped to reinvigorate itself, was held in Madrid.88 The reported 60 million
euro price tag for the event triggered a secular backlash.89
Any attempted understanding of Spanish assisted reproduction policy
cannot ignore the role of the Catholic Church in Spanish politics throughout
the twentieth century. For centuries until the late twentieth century, the
Spanish were “the most Catholic of peoples,”90 their identity inextricably
conjoined with their faith.91 The Church’s fortunes had of course waxed and
waned with divergent political tides but held on and indeed achieved
stunning political prominence during the rule of Francisco Franco, the head
of the longest totalitarian regime of the twentieth century. Before Franco,
under the parliamentary system of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, the church had lost political ground because of its alignment with
the old-line elites.92 But under Primo de Rivera, the dictator who rose to
power and brought fascism to Spain in the 1920s, upsurges of Spanish
nationalism, embracing a historic Spanish ideology to expand Christendom
and to restore traditional Spanish values, gave the Church renewed political
legitimacy.93 “Religion, in fact, became the main single ideological force
invoked to legitimize the new regime,” leading one prescient politician to
lament that “‘the Church, ignoring all its traditions, placed itself at the
service of force, against law and justice.’”94 In contrast to the Italian fascism
of the same period, marked by its conflicts with the Church,95 Primo de
Rivera dubbed his movement a Christian one,96 and it was warmly embraced
87. Stephen Burgen, Spanish Priests Join Opposition to Costly Papal Visit, THE
GUARDIAN, Aug. 9, 2011, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/09/spainpriest-oppose-pope-visit.
88. Benedictus, PP. XVI, Message of His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI for the TwentySixth World Youth Day (2011), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father
/benedict_xvi/messages/youth/documents/hf_ben-xvi_mes_20100806_youth_en.html
(last
visited Mar. 30, 2011).
89. Burgen, supra note 87.
90. STANLEY G. PAYNE, SPANISH CATHOLICISM: AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW xii (1984)
[hereinafter PAYNE, SPANISH CATHOLICISM].
91. Id. at 8–9.
92. Id. at 24.
93. Id. at 25, 29, 32–33; STANLEY G. PAYNE, FASCISM IN SPAIN, 1923–1977 at 4 (1999)
[hereinafter PAYNE, FASCISM IN SPAIN].
94. PAYNE, FASCISM IN SPAIN, supra note 93, at 31.
95. Id. at 30.
96. Id. at 31; PAYNE, THE FRANCO REGIME, supra note 85, at 26.
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by many Catholics, particularly middle-class adherents of the faith who
formerly had had little role in politics.97 Later, Francisco Franco would use
his regime’s strong Catholic identity in an attempt to distinguish Spanish
from Italian fascism.98
To some, “the Primo de Rivera dictatorship . . . seemed to provide the
final proof that the Church was in league with repression and reaction and
therefore must be brought to its knees.”99 After Primo de Rivera’s resignation
in 1930, rising anticlerical sentiment culminated in the worst persecution of
the Catholic Church that had ever been seen in Western Europe.100
Simultaneously, the Church was stripped of authority and support by the
Republican government that succeeded Primo de Rivera.101 This violent
persecution for a short while succeeded in curtailing the power of the
Church,102 but outrage and fear soon galvanized a Catholic political party
that eventually became the most redoubtable single political force in
Spain.103 Indeed, during the ensuing Spanish Civil War between the
Nationalists, led by Franco, and the Republicans, there was enthusiastic
Catholic response to the cause of nationalism104 and horrific persecution of
the Catholic establishment by their Republican opponents.105 “Catholic
backing . . . became the most important single domestic pillar of the
Nationalist movement.”106 Although loyalty to the Catholic church had not
been overt at the beginning of the conflict, once the initial rebellion had
erupted into a full-scale civil war, “the military leadership moved to take
advantage of Catholic backing”107 by pledging and eventually fashioning a
Catholic Spain that would require, among other things, the teaching of
Catholic doctrine in schools, the installation of crucifixes in classrooms, the
segregation of educational activities by gender,108 and, later, the abolition of
divorce.109 Church leaders thereafter began to voice their support of the
97. PAYNE, FASCISM IN SPAIN, supra note 93, at 28–29.
98. PAYNE, THE FRANCO REGIME, supra note 85, at 362.
99. PAYNE, SPANISH CATHOLICISM, supra note 90, at 150.
100. Id. at 168; see also José Antonio Souto Paz, Perspectives on Religious Freedom
in Spain, 2001 BYU. L. REV. 669, 670–71, 685 (2001).
101. PAYNE, SPANISH CATHOLICISM, supra note 90, at 154.
102. Id. at 38.
103. Id. at 41; PAYNE, FASCISM IN SPAIN, supra note 93, at 44.
104. PAYNE, THE FRANCO REGIME, supra note 85, at 132.
105. Id. at 198.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 198, 207, 366.
109. Id. at 362.
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Nationalist cause, some likening it to a religious crusade.110 Throughout the
term of the war, the “absolute identification of the Nationalist cause with the
church” became more and more fixed.111 Franco himself, raised a devout
Catholic, believed firmly that Spain had a special religious mission and that
faith and nationalism were inseparable.112 Indeed, during World War II,
Franco declared Catholicism to be the primary reason Spain assumed a
stance of complete neutrality: “‘Spain could never be joined to other
governments that did not hold to Catholicism as first principle.’”113
Interestingly, the Vatican did not rush to recognize the Nationalist
government during the Spanish Civil War. But Spanish prelates, forming a
united front, described the Civil War to the Holy See as an act of piety that
had reestablished and reinvigorated Catholicism in a Spain that now wanted
to cleave to the church after a period of profaning and destroying it.114 To do
so, according to this narrative, would be consistent with a return to what had
historically been Spain’s essential culture and ethos.115 Fascism in Spain
would be absolutely and truly Catholic in a manner that fascism in Italy
never desired to be. Over time, relations between Spain and the Vatican
would warm considerably.
Post-Civil War Spain was marked by repression within the country and
ostracism from without. Along with “the broadest assortment of religious
regulations seen in any twentieth-century western state,” regulations that
blurred the distinction between religious and daily life, the church hierarchy
became firmly intertwined with the workings of government and benefited
from handsome public subsidies.116 The most important political objective of
the new state was a concordat with the Vatican.117 Efforts to achieve this
were delayed by World War II, but at war’s end Franco intensified efforts to
burnish the Catholic image of his regime “in order to win the support of the
Vatican.”118 Despite Spain’s general ostracism by world leaders in the postwar period, the Vatican, though cautious, was pleased with the emergence of
a strong Catholic culture in Spain, one in which religious observance became

110. Id. at 198. This characterization continued to be made in the post-World War II
period. Id. at 367.
111. Id. at 199.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 337.
114. Id. at 199–200.
115. Id. at 202–03.
116. Id. at 368.
117. Id. at 242.
118. Id. at 349.
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embedded in social119 and political120 life to such an extent as to constitute a
bona fide “national Catholicism.”121 The Church granted Spain the fullest
possible recognition in 1953 in an agreement that expanded the
independence of the church within Spain.122 It would not be long, however,
before the first indications of dissent and secularization began to appear.123
The rapid urbanization and economic prosperity brought about by the
industrialization of the 1960s and 1970s “reoriented social psychology,
which became attuned to the common consumerist and hedonist culture of
the western world in the second half of the twentieth century.”124 This social
and cultural shift accompanied by greater wealth and foreign cultural
influences had a strong influence on Spaniards’ commitment to Catholicism:
A highly urban, sophisticated, materialist, nominally educated, and
hedonistic Spain, increasingly attuned to the secular and consumerist life of
western Europe, simply ceased to be Catholic in the traditional manner.
Though the majority of Spaniards did not reject their religious identity, they
no longer identified with the traditional values and practices of the religion
125
per se.

The lay populace was not the only constituent of the church affected by
the upheaval. Given its prior conservatism, “the Church in Spain was one of
the branches of Catholicism most profoundly affected by the cultural and
religious crisis stemming from Vatican II” in 1965.126 A highly vocal revolt
primarily among younger priests rocked the clergy127 with strident demands
for governmental reform.128 These events stoked rightist anticlericalism
against “Marxist” priests who had infiltrated the church with their subversive
ideas129 but did not succeed in stamping out more and more widespread
clerical calls for reform in the direction of democratic pluralism and more
autonomy for itself.130 By 1973, two years before Franco’s death, the Church
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 363.
Id. at 435.
Id. at 413.
Id. at 420.
Id. at 421, 439.
Id. at 483–84.
Id. at 492.
Id.
Id. at 492, 560.
Id. at 560–61.
Id. at 561.
Id. at 562, 563; see also Souto, supra note 100, at 687.
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was slipping inexorably out of the regime’s control. In his death message,
Franco proclaimed, “‘I sought always to live and die as a Catholic.’”131 He
went to his grave “the last great avatar of the traditional Spanish nationalCatholic ideology . . . . ”132 He had resisted liberalization and
democratization to the end.133
In the post-Franco years, the Church experienced a dramatic decline.134
A long-awaited moment had been reached for embracing “liberal models of
government as a reaction to the repressive Catholic conservatism of the
Franco period.”135 The 1977 Constitution made explicit that Spain no longer
had a state religion.136 In the 1977 parliamentary elections, the Church issued
a statement entitled “Moral Responsibility of the Vote” calling upon
Catholics “to assess carefully the program of the various parties in light of
their ‘ideological or operative commitments’ which affect religious values or
fundamental human rights.”137 The statement in part condemned the proposal
of certain parties to legalize abortion. But the position of the Church as a
political force to be reckoned with was weakened by the heterogeneity of
political views within the Church itself. By the spring of 1979, “the Spanish
population was sharply divided in terms of religiosity, feelings towards the
Church, and opinions on the role of the Church in society.”138 Although the
Spanish government did not reject the Church and in fact continued to
sustain it in important ways,139 there has been “a liberal reaction against the
spiritual formalism and social conformity of earlier times.”140 The Church in
this more recent period has unsuccessfully opposed the legalization of
divorce, abortion141 and same-sex marriage. 142 The Church’s stance on these
issues has placed it in opposition to the government rather than in alignment

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

PAYNE, THE FRANCO REGIME, supra note 85, at 620.
Id.
Id. at 640.
PAYNE, SPANISH CATHOLICISM supra note 90, at 218.
PATRICK HANAFIN, CONCEIVING LIFE: REPRODUCTIVE POLITICS AND THE LAW IN
CONTEMPORARY ITALY 78 (2007).
136. Souto, supra note 100, at 691.
137. RICHARD GUNTHER ET AL., SPAIN AFTER FRANCO: THE MAKING OF A COMPETITIVE
PARTY SYSTEM 223–24 (1986).
138. Id. at 230.
139. PAYNE, THE FRANCO REGIME, supra note 85, at 222.
140. Id. at 224 (talking about priests).
141. Id. at 226.
142. Giles Tremlett, Gay Marriage Law Alarms Spain’s Religious Leaders, THE
GUARDIAN, Apr. 22, 2005, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/apr/22
/spain.gayrights?INTCMP=ILCNETTXT3487.
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with it.143 Spain’s constitutional court recently stripped the Church of what
had long been its right to fire teachers of religious education in state schools
“who do not follow Catholic precepts in their relationships.”144 The 2010
visit of the Pope to Spain was marked by, if not a chilly reception from the
government, at least one that was noticeably lukewarm. President Zapatero
did not attend the mass celebrated to consecrate the basilica of La Sagrada
Familia in Barcelona and spent a mere five “cordial” minutes with the Pope
in an airport hangar as the pontiff was preparing to embark on his return to
Rome.145 The image was a powerful reminder that Spain, in stark contrast to
the Franco years, is currently noticeably estranged from the Catholic Church.
B. Italy
Like Spain and other European countries with totalitarian pasts, Italy
today touts its commitment to democracy and pluralism. But underlying this
public image is a long history of patriarchy and Catholicism that still has
strong undercurrents on many different levels in contemporary Italian
society.146 Saying Italy is a Catholic country really means that “Italian views
of marriage, the family, and social justice, along with Italian cultural values
and education, have remained very largely Catholic.”147
The issue of the intertwinement of the Church with politics
unquestionably has deeper roots,148 but it has been “a fact of daily life” since
the founding of the Italian Republic in 1861.149 The new state was founded
upon a commitment to the separation of church and state that rankled the
Church and inspired it to withhold its recognition and to forbid the faithful
143. PAYNE, SPANISH CATHOLICISM, supra note 90, at 226.
144. Giles Tremlett, Spain Ends Church Control over Religion Teachers’ Married
Lives, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 20, 2011, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr
/20/spain-catholic-church-religion-teacher?INTCMP=ILCNETTXT3487.
145. El Papa se reúne con Zapatero al término de su visita a Barcelona, LA
VANGUARDIA, Nov. 7, 2010, available at http://www.lavanguardia.es/ciudadanos/noticias
/20101107/54065821708.html.
146. Jeff Pratt, Catholic Culture, in ITALIAN CULTURAL STUDIES: AN INTRODUCTION
129, 140–42 (David Forgacs & Robert Lumley eds. 1996) (discussing how Catholic culture
goes beyond attending church services).
147. INTRODUCTION TO MODERN ITALY: A TOPICAL HISTORY SINCE 1861 xxviii
(Edward R. Tannenbaum & Emiliana P. Noether eds., N.Y. Univ. Press 1974).
148. Carlo Ungaro, The Catholic Church and Italian Politics, OPEDNEWS (Feb. 2,
2011),
http://www.opednews.com/articles/The-Catholic-Church-and-It-by-Carlo-Ungaro110202-940.html.
149. ROSANNA MULAZZI GIAMMANCO, THE CATHOLIC-COMMUNIST DIALOGUE IN
ITALY: 1944 TO THE PRESENT 84 (1989).
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from holding public office or voting in national elections.150 The Church
knew that the separation of church and state was likely to create a crisis of
identity among the populace that could cause the new republic to founder.151
In the words of Italian historian Alberto Acquarone: “Italy differed from all
other European nation-states because the centuries-old special connection
between Italian society and the Catholic church was bound to provoke a
permanent, if only latent, crisis of identity in the most politically conscious
Italians, an emotional strain that could even upset non-believers.”152 The non
expedit was eventually lifted, allowing Catholics to vote in Italian elections
for the first time in 1904.153
As did Spain, Italy fell to fascism in the 1920s. Under Mussolini, the
country pursued an imperialist agenda the strength of which was said to
depend upon the will of women to become committed reproducers of the
nation and increase the birth rate.154 A legal framework was constructed to
advance these aims. Part of this framework was the criminalization of birth
control and abortion, the bachelor tax and birth bonuses for large families.155
The Church remained the only institution not fully fitted within the
totalitarian state.156 Mussolini, sensing an opportunity to galvanize his power
with Church support, paid a high price to enter into the Lateran Pacts which
made the Vatican a sovereign city-state with the pope at its helm and granted
the Church numerous desirable properties in exchange for its recognition of
the Italian government and its relinquishment of its claim to its extensive
former territorial holdings, the Papal States. The Pacts also established
Catholicism as the official state religion157 and the right of the Church to
control broad swaths of family life and religious instruction in public

150. MARIO B. MIGNONE, ITALY TODAY: AT THE CROSSROADS OF THE NEW
MILLENNIUM 255 (1998); HARRY HEARDER, ITALY: A SHORT HISTORY 203 (1990).
151. D.A. BINCHY, CHURCH AND STATE IN FASCIST ITALY 61 (1941) (noting that Pope
Leo XIII hoped “that a complete boycott of the polling-booths by Catholic voters would
undermine the already shaky foundations of [modern] Italy”).
152. Alberto Acquarone, A Closing Commentary: Problems of Democracy and the
Quest for Identity, in MODERN ITALY: A TOPICAL HISTORY SINCE 1861 355, 359 (1974).
153. HEARDER, supra note 150, at 209.
154. HANAFIN, supra note 135, at 15–16; VICTORIA DE GRAZIA, HOW FASCISM RULED
WOMEN: ITALY 1922-1945, at xi (1992) (“[T]he Duce’s regime fell back on the traditional
authority of family and religion to enforce biologically determined roles as mother and
caretakers.”).
155. HANAFIN, supra note 135, at 16.
156. BINCHY, supra note 151, at 684.
157. MIGNONE, supra note 150, at 255, 258.
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education. Handsome public subsidies, phased out nearly sixty years later,158
rounded out the concessions made by the government to the Church.159
Unlike in Spain, where democratic reforms occurred rapidly following
the death of Franco, the dismantling of fascism in Italy around 1945 did not
lead to any deep alteration in the sociopolitical terrain.160 The “patriarchal
model of social relations” remained strong. The first Italian Constitution of
1948 was very much infused by Roman Catholic natural law perspectives on
responsible family relations; fascist-era laws on abortion and contraception
remained in place. According to Patrick Hanafin, the “textual fantasy of
pluralism” in the Constitution simply did not include women.161 What further
exacerbated social division was the Church’s penchant for meddling in
politics. The Constitution granted the Church privileges unlike any other
democratic country,162 setting the stage for the Church to inject itself “into
every aspect of civil life . . . . ”163 The Church attempted to control the
political sphere during this period via an edict of excommunication against
any Catholic who voted for a Communist or a Socialist, read or distributed
communist literature or merely sympathized with those parties’ positions.164
The political world was divided into saints and devils.165
From 1948 until the mid-to-late-1960s, Catholics for the most part, with
the encouragement of the Vatican, supported the Christian Democratic Party,
ensuring the Church’s continued political influence.166 The party acted
largely as an agent of the Church,167 stressing the sanctity of the family as
against the claims of the State.168 After the death of Pius XII, the Church
appeared to distance itself from politics as it grappled with concerns of a
more spiritual and pastoral nature.169 As in most Western nations, the 1960s
158. Id. at 267–68.
159. Id. at 255–56.
160. See ROBERT WALLACE, THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, 178–92 (1978).
161. HANAFIN, supra note 135, at 17.
162. MIGNONE, supra note 150, at 251.
163. Id. at 258.
164. GIAMMANCO, supra note 149, at 4. See also MIGNONE, supra note 150, at 258
(recounting that Pope Pius XII issued a decree prohibiting Catholics from joining the
communist party “and from writing, reading, publishing, or distributing any communist
literature”); DUGGAN, supra note 82, at 265.
165. MIGNONE, supra note 150, at 260.
166. GIAMMANCO, supra note 149, at 6, 85. See also MIGNONE, supra note 150, at 257
(“At election time, the Church, from the pope down to the parish priest, stated that it was a
religious duty to vote for the [Christian Democrats]”); DUGGAN, supra note 82, at 254.
167. GIAMMANCO, supra note 149, at 84.
168. DUGGAN, supra note 82, at 260.
169. Id. at 266.

748

RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:725

and 1970s brought a period of increasing secularization to Italy, disaffection
with the Christian Democrats who had for so long remained in power,170 and
a steep falling off of church attendance and membership.171 Consistent with
this change, in the late 1960s the Constitutional Court began to issue
decisions that declared entrenched gender inequality in family relations and
the workplace to be in violation of constitutional guarantees.172 As a part of
this move toward more individual rights-based interpretations of the
Constitution, the court nullified a notorious criminal adultery law that
punished a wife’s adultery more severely than a husband’s.173 There were
legislative developments as well, most notably the legalization of divorce in
1970 and of abortion in 1978.174 Public referenda failed to nullify those laws
in 1974 and 1981, respectively.175 Although some believe the election of the
non-Italian pope, John Paul II, in 1978 signaled the determination of the
Church to play a more restrained role in Italian affairs,176 in fact the Church’s
influence continued to be felt in elections where the Church’s power was
threatened.177 At such critical junctures, the Church called upon the faithful
to “show their Catholicity,”178 but the tepid response, prompted in part by the
view that the Church was merely a tool of the bourgeoisie,179 proved that the
Catholic Church’s ascendancy over family matters had suffered a noticeable
setback. By 1975 “a decisive majority of Italians had stated implicitly that
religious doctrine was not to be the basis of the country’s laws or social
life.”180
By the 1990s, with legalized contraception and the rise of consumerism,
Italy’s birthrate fell to the lowest in the world.181 Italy had for a long time
170.
171.
172.

HANAFIN, supra note 135, at 21–23.
DUGGAN, supra note 82, at 276.
Luisa Passerini, Gender Relations, in ITALIAN CULTURAL STUDIES: AN
INTRODUCTION 144, 145–46 (David Forgacs & Robert Lumley eds., 1996); SPENCER M.
DISCALA, ITALY: FROM REVOLUTION TO REPUBLIC, 1700 TO THE PRESENT 314 (1995).
173. HANAFIN, supra note 135, at 22.
174. Id. at 23.
175. Miele Paolo, Femministe di sinistra sedotte dallo scientismo, CORRIERE DELLA
SERA, May 3, 2011, at 46; ARTURO CARLO JEMOLO, CHIESA E STATO IN ITALIA NEGLI ULTIMI
CENTO ANNI 553 (1971); DUGGAN, supra note 82, at 274.
176. MIGNONE, supra note 150, at 254.
177. GIAMMANCO, supra note 149, at 84.
178. Id. (“At such times, they aggressively remind the Italian population of its Catholic
roots and urge it to vote in unison for the Christian Democratic Party.”).
179. MIGNONE, supra note 150, at 262.
180. Id. at 262–63.
181. DISCALA, supra note 172, at 314; PAUL GINSBORG, ITALY AND ITS DISCONTENTS:
FAMILY, CIVIL SOCIETY, STATE 1980–2001, at 69 (2003).
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been gaining a reputation as a country that was on the cutting edge of
reproductive science. It was a place where it was possible to acquire even
unusual forms of assisted reproduction. Cases of postmenopausal mothers
and even claims by one doctor that he had perfected and achieved human
reproductive cloning stoked the outside world’s view of Italy as a place
where anything was possible.182 There was support for some form of
regulation going back to the birth of the first IVF baby in Italy in 1983, but
the vast ideological divide between positions made any movement in the
direction of legislation infeasible.183 Physicians groups and politicians were
divided internally on the issue along secular-religious lines.184 Politicians in
Italy have tended to avoid issues of bioethical controversy because of the
fear of a conservative backlash and concomitant loss of political support.
Thus, for many years, there was a lack of political will to proceed.185
The Church’s “interference in Italian political life has become
increasingly pervasive and forceful . . . . ”186 The Church has mobilized to
create alliances with the government that constitute a theo-conservative
backlash against what are perceived to be legislated threats to the traditional
family.187 Throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s, the Catholic Church has
been managing its alliance with the government through its strategy of
engaging directly in political action. It has been able through these efforts to
tap into a religiosity that had gone dormant under the influence of an
increasingly consumerist culture.188 At the same time, the government has
found a useful ally with whom to trade favors. In short, the Church made a
deal with the government that if it would pass a strict law on assisted
reproduction then it could count on the Church’s backing on other issues.189
In 2001, with the emergence of a stable coalition in Parliament, a
government that had remained relatively agnostic about assisted reproduction
finally became very interested in enacting restrictive legislation. Little
Parliamentary opposition arose because the opposition party was comprised
of many avowed Catholics. The leader of the opposition simply made the
lackluster statement that the membership should be able to vote their
182. HANAFIN, supra note 135, at 55.
183. Id. at 54.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 56.
186. Ungaro, supra note 148.
187. HANAFIN, supra note 135, at 25.
188. Id. at 54 (“The levels of religiosity remain comparatively high in Italy in relation
to other European Catholic countries such as, for example, Ireland and Spain.”). See also id. at
66, 80; DISCALA, supra note 172, at 313.
189. HANAFIN, supra note 135, at 60–61.
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consciences on such a volatile issue.190 The resulting legislation is
breathtakingly restrictive. In addition to restricting access to stable
heterosexual couples, the law also outlaws heterologous forms of assisted
reproduction and prohibits pre-implantation genetic diagnosis and
cryopreservation. Before the provision was questioned by the Constitutional
Court, the law also forbade the creation of more than three embryos in any
one IVF cycle and the insertion of all embryos created in the patient’s uterus.
Inconsistencies in the Italian legislation reveal the lack of control that
physicians had over the final legislation, in sharp contrast to the way Spain’s
legislation was brought about. This lack of physician control can be seen in
Article 6.3, which allows an individual’s consent to the procedure to be
withdrawn only up to the point at which the egg is fertilized. According to
Hanafin, “this leads to a bizarre result whereby the woman involved could
potentially be forced to go through with the procedure once the egg is
fertili[z]ed.”191 Post-enactment, scientists have criticized the law as antiscientific and detrimental to human rights.192 On the ground, clinicians began
in earnest to report the effects that the law was having on outcomes. Some
reported unfavorable outcomes, but other clinicians saw the issue differently,
suggesting that the law had had a positive effect on spontaneous embryonic
loss in single and multiple pregnancies.193 Doctors were also involved in the
subsequent attempt to overturn the law by referendum.194 However, the
Church’s call for a boycott of the polls was successful, and the legislation
remained in place.195 To some, the failure of the referendum was not so much
a product of Vatican meddling as it was the inability of the populace to
identify with the problems of the infertile. Perhaps too, Italians were not only
uninformed but apathetic, worn out by years of referenda that could not
achieve a quorum. They were “drained of curiosity or civic responsibility.
They simply couldn’t be bothered to inform themselves of what exactly was
190. Id. at 61.
191. Id. at 64. See also Antonello Miranda, In Vitro Veritas? The New Italian Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2004: Legal Issues Between Balance of Individual Interests
and Social Priorities , in FAMILY LAW: BALANCING INTERESTS AND PURSUING PRIORITIES 270–
74 (Lynn Wardle & Camille S. Williams eds., 2007).
192. Fabio Poletti, Il Tribunale: La Legge 40 Viola Il Diritto A Formare Una
Famiglia, Fecondazione assistita, è scontro anche Milano ricorre alla Consulta, LA STAMPA,
Feb. 4, 2011, at 18.
193. Giovanni Battista La Sala, Pregnancy Loss and Assisted Reproduction:
Preliminary Results after the Law 40/2004 in Italy, 13 REPROD. BIOMEDIC. ONLINE 65–70
(2006).
194. HANAFIN, supra note 135, at 65.
195. Id. at 65–66.
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at stake in this referendum.”196 Early constitutional challenges to the law also
failed. The decisions seemed to be imbued by the spirit behind the original
law, which was “the protection of ‘Life’ itself in the abstract.”197 In the
words of Patrick Hanafin, the Italian embryo now occupies legal space.
At this point in time, and in the current political climate, it seems highly
unlikely that any sort of reform will emanate from the legislature in Italy.
Instead, the fight over Italy’s assisted reproduction law has now moved to the
courts. In early 2010, the Italian Constitutional Court struck down provisions
in the Italian law mandating the production of at most three embryos in any
one IVF cycle and requiring the immediate return of all embryos produced to
the uterus. The primary objection of the court was that, in purporting to
protect embryonic life, the law made no account of the medical fact that “it is
impossible to procreate without a certain degree of early embryo loss.”198 A
second objection was that the law rendered clinical judgment practically
irrelevant in the treatment of patients despite the individualized
circumstances of different patients. The Italian Constitutional Court was
unwilling to defer to the legislature where a less intrusive approach—the
resort to medical judgment—was available. In 2011, the European Court of
Human Rights accepted a case brought to challenge the anti-PGD provisions
of the Italian law as a violation of the right to private life and the antidiscrimination provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights.199
Other aspects of the Italian law may also fail to satisfy the Convention.
In outlawing all forms of heterologous reproduction, the legislature’s stated
goal was to reaffirm the heterosexual couple as the only appropriate locus for
family formation and to avert the dangers that attend the introduction of
third-party gametes or embryos into the reproductive process, namely: (1) the
threat to a couple’s relationship of having children not biologically related to
both of them; (2) the psychological danger to a child who does not know the
identity of and is not raised by both of his biological parents; and (3) injury
to Italian society at large due to increases in marital breakdown and
psychologically damaged children. But the prevalence with which Italian
citizens, burdened by the restrictive law, seek assisted reproductive care in
196. Id. at 66 n.24.
197. Id. at 68. Both of the constitutional cases involved couples who wanted to ensure
that their embryos would not be affected by beta thallassemia. Id. at 67–68.
198. Giuseppe Benagiano & Luca Gianaroli, The Italian Constitutional Court Modifies
Italian Legislation on Assisted Reproduction Technology, 20 REPROD. BIOMEDIC. ONLINE
398–402 (2010).
199. Margherita De Bac, Fecondazione negata a noi malati: La Corte europea
accoglie il ricorso, CORRIERE DELLA SERA, June 28, 2011, at 22.
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other countries calls into question what harms Italy’s ban on heterologous
reproduction is aimed at combating. Via cross-border reproductive travel,
which admittedly cannot be outlawed if it takes place within the European
Union, all of the feared dangers to patients, children, and society become
subject to importation into Italy when patients return from abroad and give
birth. Nonetheless, Italian legislators have not moved to enact provisions to
combat these dangers or temper their ill effects. Despite the supposed
importance of biological ties, the law itself makes clear that a gamete
provider has no parental rights or obligations and that the commissioning
couple is indisputably the child’s parents. Despite the fragility of family
bonds that are thought to attend third-party gamete donation, the law
contains no provision requiring the couple to adopt the child so as to solidify
those bonds. It fails even to make a symbolic gesture in favor of the child’s
right to know his biological parents. Absolutely no consequences whatsoever
attend the use of third-party gametes abroad; indeed, life proceeds as normal
upon the delivery of the child in Italy.
Despite these anomalies, it seems probable that Italy’s prohibition on
reproducing with donated gametes or embryos will remain in place. The
Constitutional Court was asked to consider the question after cases were
brought to nullify the law in lower courts in Milan, Florence and Catania.200
The court in Milan ruled that the law violates the right to form a family,
including the right to have children.201 The Constitutional Court did not
decide the question but remanded the cases to the respective lower courts to
reconsider their decisions in light of S.H. v. Austria, a European Court of
Human Rights decision upholding Austria’s restrictions on certain forms of
heterologous reproduction.202 In S.H., the European Court determined that
Austria was owed deference to legislate as it saw fit, given that moral and
ethical responses to assisted reproduction are ever changing in an area so
punctuated by fast-moving medical and scientific developments.203 The
remand of the challenges to the ban on heterologous reproduction may be a
signal that Italy’s constitution will not be a vigorous source of support, at
200. Simona Ravizza, Fecondazione eterologa alla Consulta, CORRIERE DELLA SERA,
Feb. 4, 2011, at 6; Margherita De Bac, La legge sulla fecondazione torna alla Consulta,
CORRIERE DELLA SERA, Oct. 7, 2010, at 13.
201. Poletti, supra note 192, at 18.
202. Margherita De Bac, Consulta, rimane il divieto della fecondazione eterologa,
CORRIERE DELLA SERA, May 23, 2012, at 29. S.H. v. Austria is available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=894729&portal=hbkm
&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649.
203. S.H. v. Austria, Application no. 57813/00, Nov. 3, 2011, at ¶ 97.
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least in the near term, for Italians who require the participation of gamete and
embryo donors in order to have children.
IV. THE ROAD TO REGULATION: PHYSICIANS, FEMINISM AND ABORTION
Europe is the area of the world that presents the most disparities and
contradictions in the fields of family planning and reproductive and sexual
health.204 The most glaring discrepancies exist between Western and Eastern
Europe:
Family planning in Western Europe has been the story of the people against
the authorities. In Central and Eastern Europe it has been the opposite. It has
been the story of the government against the people. That essential difference
205
still explains most of the discrepancies between the two parts of Europe.

Within Western Europe, too, there are wide discrepancies, at least as
regards the regulation of assisted reproduction. In the 1980s, infertile couples
in Spain felt great shame about their inability to conceive. It was important to
keep it a secret because of the general ignorance that kept infertility
enshrouded in stigma. That the “cure” for infertility would entail decoupling
reproduction from copulation inspired fear and controversy in many quarters
rather than curiosity and rational thought. In the words of Marcelo Palacios,
the “father” of the assisted reproduction law in Spain and currently President
of the International Society of Bioethics, the advent of IVF forced Spain, a
technologically backward country, to confront the future head on, and almost
without warning.206 Pedro Barri, who along with Anna Veiga delivered the
first IVF baby in Spain, remembers that the ensuing social debate revealed
the general inability of the Spanish populace to comprehend that infertility
was a problem that could be addressed through advancements in science.
Indeed, reproductive technology was not considered science at all but some
form of sorcery or witchcraft.207 Currently the director of the Stem Cell Bank
and Chairman of the European Society of Reproductive Medicine, Veiga has
204. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, STEERING COMMITTEE FOR EQUALITY BETWEEN WOMEN AND
MEN, GUARANTEEING FREEDOM OF CHOICE IN MATTERS OF REPRODUCTION, SEXUALITY AND
LIFESTYLES IN EUROPE: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 52 (1999).
205. Id. at 52–53.
206. Interview with Marcelo Palacios, President and Founder, International Society of
Bioethics (Nov. 23, 2010).
207. Interview with Pedro Barri, Director, Department of Obstetrics, Gynecology and
Reproduction, USP Institut Universitari Dexeus (Dec. 9, 2010).
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a similar recollection. People in general had no capacity to understand the
science, and this led them to jump to emotional conclusions that were at
times incompatible. People would vacillate between a reactive desire to
protect embryos and their heartfelt view that infertile people should have
access to a miraculous new science.208 There was very little consistency or
lucidity in the public debate. The general ignorance, even though it was
fertile ground for fearful reactions and contributed to the volatility of the
issue, made it easier for those with superior knowledge to obtain the
permissive law they desired.209 Spain stands in contrast, then, to many
countries where the climate of fear that has arisen in response to new
reproductive technologies has led to legal restrictions on techniques and
access.
In order to ensure progress and the expansion of scientific research,
physicians took the lead in defining the terms of the debate in Spain.210
Unlike medical groups in Italy, which were unable to present a unified stance
on assisted reproduction,211 the medical sector in Spain banded together in
favor of scientific progress.
The agenda of infertility physicians in Spain was first to convince the
public that infertility is a disease. The hope was that steering the public’s
understanding toward this view would lead to social acceptance of the
medical techniques that had been developed and that would be developed in
the future to address the problem. “Our goal,” writes Veiga in her book The
Miracle of Life, “was to provide the necessary information so that the public
would understand what we were really doing.”212 Part of the campaign
involved using media channels as educational tools. Physicians’ second
important effort was in the direction of regulation. Unlike in the United
States, where physicians tend to dislike and oppose regulation, in Spain,
“[w]e realized we needed regulation because even though we could not
208. We see the same sort of vacillation with respect to embryonic stem cell research
today. A broad swath of Spanish society believes that embryos should be protected, but do not
reject therapeutic cloning. Interview with Carlos Romeo, Director, Interuniversity Chair in
Law and the Human Genome, University of Deusto (Nov. 12, 2010).
209. In reference to the Warnock Report, Strathern notes, “[t]hus, the knowledge and
interests of those directly involved in research or in clinical practice sometimes appeared
juxtaposed to what they saw as the public misunderstanding of science or as unfounded
nightmare scenarios, as well as to the overt needs of those for whom such developments
offered hope and relief.” STRATHERN, supra note 1, at 4.
210. Dubouchet & Klöti, supra note 10, at 102.
211. HANAFIN, supra note 135, at 54.
212. ANNA VEIGA, EL MILAGRO DE LA VIDA: DE LA FECUNDACIÓN IN VITRO A LAS
CÉLULAS MADRE 145 (2011).
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foresee everything that would happen, we knew something had changed with
respect to reproduction.”213 In particular, physicians saw how their
colleagues abroad had no shield against legal conflicts that had already
occurred and were bound to occur with more frequency if a preemptive legal
framework was not formally established. Thus, infertility physicians in Spain
were eager to align themselves with politicians who were examining the
issue around 1986. Barri and three other physicians accepted an invitation
from Marcelo Palacios to address the congressional commission that had
been created to examine the issue. Committee members looked to these
physicians for information on the medical aspects of assisted reproduction.
Palacios and others recall that the feminist opposition to a permissive
law regulating assisted reproduction was weak. There was initially an outcry
and some demonstrations, but, as Veiga recollects, feminists did not present
a unified front, unlike the feminists in Italy who, in the 1970s, had been able
to establish an impressive power base in an era that saw the dismantling of
proscriptions on abortion, contraception, and divorce.214 Instead, some were
in favor of assisted reproduction and some were against it. But neither group
was thinking in much detail about the techniques or in a sufficiently serious
manner about them. The dichotomy within feminist perspectives on assisted
reproduction was also evident at the time Italy was debating placing
restrictions on assisted reproduction. The mass feminist movement of the
1970s had broken apart, and its stance on assisted reproductive technologies
was not uniform.215 After the Spanish law on assisted reproduction was
enacted, Matorras perceived the feminist movement to be more univocal. He
recalls that Spanish feminists did not like the law initially because they saw
IVF as a technique created by males for the purpose of experimenting on
women’s bodies. Later, however, they began to defend IVF, because the law
in Spain allows single women to give birth to and rear children with a
minimum of male interference.216 Matorras is probably referring to the
radical feminist perspective when he remembers the early opposition to the
law. Feminist responses to reproductive technology are varied and have
broken down largely along the lines of radical and liberal perspectives.
Radical feminists note that, despite the high incidence of male infertility
213. Interview with Anna Veiga, Director, Stem Cell Bank, Center of Regenerative
Medicine of Barcelona; Chairman, European Society of Human Reproduction and
Embryology (Nov. 15, 2010).
214. HANAFIN, supra note 135, at 27.
215. Id. at 53–54.
216. Interview with Roberto Matorras, Director, Human Reproduction Unit, Hospital
de Cruces (Nov. 11, 2010).
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worldwide, infertility is invariably cast as a female problem.217 Institutional
ignorance about the environmental causes of infertility and a myopic focus
on women's reproductive capacity to the detriment of other health issues of
concern to women become entrenched.218 Consequently, to satisfy the
masculine insistence on having a biological connection to offspring, the
bodies both of infertile women and of those who are paired with infertile
men become subject to a host of medical interventions, including not only
invasive in vitro fertilization but also experimentation that is of little benefit
to them.219 The general hostility some feminist adherents bear toward
reproductive technology arises from the view “that women’s choice to
participate in infertility treatments is so conditioned by the socially
constructed stigma of infertility and a socially imposed norm of maternity as
to be no real ‘choice’ at all.”220 By contrast, liberal feminists believe that
reproductive technology enhances the role of choice in procreative decisionmaking. Through this lens, even assisted reproductive arrangements
involving surrogate motherhood appear unproblematic, at least if measures
are taken to ensure full and fair disclosure and to safeguard against
overreaching.221
A unifying feature of both the radical and the liberal perspectives is their
common commitment to opposing discrimination. Both radical and liberal
feminists fear that the reproductive technology industry may attempt to
channel people in the direction of “responsible” procreation and thereby
217. Arthur L. Greil, Infertile Bodies: Medicalization, Metaphor, and Agency, in
INFERTILITY AROUND THE GLOBE: NEW THINKING ON CHILDLESSNESS, GENDER, AND
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 101, 101 (Marcia C. Inhorn & Frank van Balen eds., 2002);
Frank van Balen & Marcia C. Inhorn, Interpreting Infertility: A View from the Social Sciences,
in INFERTILITY AROUND THE GLOBE: NEW THINKING ON CHILDLESSNESS, GENDER, AND
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 3, 19 (Marcia C. Inhorn & Frank van Balen eds., 2002).
218. Federico Neresini & Franca Bimbi, The Lack and the “Need” of Regulation for
Assisted Fertilization: The Italian Case, in BODIES OF TECHNOLOGY: WOMEN'S INVOLVEMENT
WITH REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE 207, 210 (Ann Rudinow Saetnan, Nelly Oudshoorn, et al. eds.,
2000); see also Marcia C. Inhorn & K. Lisa Whittle, Feminism Meets the “New”
Epidemiologies: Toward an Appraisal of Antifeminist Biases, 53 SOC. SCI. & MED. 553, 55961 (2001) (discussing the view of current biomedical and public health models).
219. See PAUL LAURITZEN, PURSUING PARENTHOOD: ETHICAL ISSUES IN ASSISTED
REPRODUCTION 14–18, 29 (1993) (referring to feminist objections to using IVF to treat malefactor infertility).
220. JANET GALLAGHER, Eggs, Embryos and Foetuses: Anxiety and the Law, in
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: GENDER, MOTHERHOOD AND MEDICINE 138, 146 (Michelle
Stanworth ed., 1987).
221. Karen H. Rothenberg, Feminism, Law, and Bioethics, 6 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J.
69, 70, 75 (1996).
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perpetrate discrimination against single mothers, gays and lesbians, the poor,
and others deemed undeserving of parenthood.222 On this issue, feminists
transcend the labels “radical” and “liberal” to express a common concern
about the perpetuation of inequality and exploitation by powerful
institutions.
On another front, Veiga recalls that there was some opposition to the law
from anti-abortionists. In Italy and Spain, abortion, disallowed for most of
the twentieth century, became the subject of intense debate in the late 1970s
and early 1980s. In Italy, “the attack on the abortion law was led by the
women’s liberation movement.”223 The final act passed in 1978 “allowed
abortion on request during the first ninety days of pregnancy at the expense
of the state.”224 In Spain, under Franco, abortion, birth control and divorce
were illegal, and women found guilty of adultery could be sent to prison for
up to six years.225 After the death of Franco, birth control and divorce were
legalized and adultery eliminated as a criminal offense.226 The abortion
prohibition remained the law until 1985, when a “grounds-system model”
was enacted to permit abortion where the women’s physical or mental health
was at risk (at any time during the pregnancy), where the pregnancy was the
result of rape and the rape has first been reported to the police (up to twelve
weeks), and in cases of fetal impairment (up to twenty-two weeks).227 This
law was changed in 2010 in a shift to a “time-system.” Now, abortion in
Spain tends to be more of a medical question than a religious or political one.
Even minors (up to 17) can choose to have an abortion in consultation with
their physicians, without the consent of their parents, although they must
show that at least one of their parents has been informed.228 In contrast,

222. Hilary Rose, Victorian Values in the Test-Tube: The Politics of Reproductive
Science and Technology, in REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 220, at 172 (“Now it is
precisely this agreement (between obstetrician and ethicist)—that doctors naturally are the
right profession to decide who is a suitable case for infertility treatment or gene therapy—that
must be a major source of political and particularly feminist concern.”).
223. COLIN FRANCOME, ABORTION FREEDOM: A WORLDWIDE MOVEMENT 144 (1984).
224. Id. at 145–46.
225. Id. at 211–12.
226. Id. at 212.
227. Isabel Zurita Martín, British and Spanish Legislation on Abortion: A Brief
Comparative Overview, 163 L. & JUST. 127, 128 (2009).
228. María R. Sahuquillo, Los médicos decidirán se las menores pueden abortar solas,
EL PÁIS, May 25, 2010, available at http://www.elpais.com/articulo/sociedad/medicos
/decidiran/menores/pueden/abortar/solas/elpepisoc/20100525elpepisoc3/Tes.
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assisted reproduction can be freely elected by minors of at least 16 years of
age.229
As a general matter, the Catholic Church believes that permissive views
toward assisted reproduction extend from an “abortion-mentality.”230
Abortion and assisted reproduction are intertwined, because abortion
“deprives a category of human beings of the protection which civil
legislation must accord them,” thus undermining the principle of equal
treatment, and legalizing techniques of assisted reproduction exposes the
resulting children to this same risk. Legalization threatens “the very
foundations of a state based on law.”231 This view that assisted reproduction
risks undermining the very fabric of civil society is a common theme
throughout Donum Vitae,232 but was not effective in undermining support for
a liberal law in Spain. Veiga remembers that in her debate with antiabortionists, they came across as uninformed and confused about the
distinctions between abortion and assisted reproductive technology. In sharp
contrast to Italy, where “the Church drove the design and implementation of
[assisted reproduction] legislation on its terms,”233 the Catholic Church’s
opposition in Spain was weak and ineffective in gaining the ear of the
committee studying the issue.
Feminist and anti-abortion opposition to assisted reproduction might
have been more forcefully voiced at the time of the enactment of the Spanish
provisions, but if so, it was inaudible. At a later stage of the legislative
process, the Partido Popular, the party most in alignment with Catholic
perspectives, was headed by a single woman, María Dolores de Cospedal,
who became a single mother with the aid of IVF. Some constituents submit
that de Cospedal’s and other party members’ use of IVF renders them
insufficiently Catholic to be authentically against abortion.234 Although this
point of view too cavalierly assumes that those who employ assisted

229. Id.
230. Donum Vitae, supra note 79, at 10, 11.
231. Id. at 19–20.
232. Id. at 12, 13 and 19.
233. Id. at 79.
234. La FIV que practican muchos, Comment to Aguirre pide que no intenten
enfrentarla a Cospedal por Cascos, HAZTEOIR.ORG (Jan. 25, 2011, 12:52 PM),
http://www.hazteoir.org/noticia/35486-aguirre-pide-que-no-intenten-enfrentarla-cospedalcascos; ¿Estàn realmente en contro el aborto? (Oct. 7, 2010), http://infocatolica.com/blog
/cartadirector.php/1007050904-iestan-realmente-en-contra-de (commentary of Maurice
Pinay).
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reproduction necessarily are in favor of a liberal abortion policy,235 it
nonetheless points out that conservative views about assisted reproduction
are unlikely to have any effect on Spain’s liberal law even now that the
Partido Popular has wrestled power from the Socialists236 who controlled the
legislature at the time the law was passed.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES
In contrast to Italy and Spain and other countries in Europe, with their
comprehensive legislative regimes governing assisted reproduction, the
United States is largely devoid of governmental regulation of this
controversial area of medicine,237 leaving the medical profession to police
itself even with respect to the minimal federally mandated reporting
requirements that do exist.238 The American Society of Reproductive
Medicine (ASRM) and its affiliate the Society for Assisted Reproductive
Technology (SART), the dominant professional societies in this area of
medical practice, have developed a voluntary accreditation program that
requires clinics to adhere to its guidelines and practices standards.239 There
are no legal consequences for clinics that elect not to pursue accreditation
under this program.240 This state of affairs appears to be firmly entrenched,
235. CAROLYN SAVAGE & SEAN SAVAGE, INCONCEIVABLE: A Medical Mistake, the
Baby We Couldn't Keep, and Our Choice to Deliver the Ultimate Gift (2010) (showing that
this assumption may well be false among Catholics in particular). Observant Catholic,
Carolyn Savage, attempting to have a child via IVF with her husband Sean, was implanted
with the wrong embryo. The couple’s strong views against abortion made aborting the fetus an
untenable solution to their problem. After Carolyn gave birth, the couple surrendered custody
of the child to his genetic parents.
236. Álvaro Carvajal, El PP arolla al PSOE en las urnas, EL MUNDO, May 23, 2011,
http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2011/05/21/espana/1306012078.html.
237. Alicia Ouelette et al., Lessons Across the Pond: Assisted Reproductive
Technology in the United Kingdom and the United States, 31 AM. J. L. & MED. 419, 422
(2005) (“[N]o comprehensive policy governs ART in the U.S.”); see also William R. Keye, Jr.
et al., A Survey of the Practices and Opinions of the Domestic Members of the American
Society for Reproductive Medicine, 82 FERTILITY & STERILITY 536 (2004).
238. Ouelette et al., supra note 237, at 427 (noting that data reporting by infertility
clinics, although mandated by federal law, is in effect voluntary).
239. See David Adamson, Regulation of Assisted Reproductive Technologies in the
United States, in REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: A READER 1, 9 (Thomas A. Shannon ed.,
2004). Members, however, are not required to adhere to the ASRM Ethics Committee’s
opinions. Id. at 8 (describing the ASRM’s ethical pronouncements as “creat[ing] standards for
self-regulation”). Eighty-three percent of respondents to a survey of ASRM members reported
following ASRM Ethics Committee opinions. See Keye, Jr. et al., supra note 237, at 537.
240. Ouelette et al., supra note 237, at 430.
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given that at the federal level there is virtually no debate about regulating
assisted reproduction,241 and at the state level we find only a patchwork of
disconnected provisions covering discrete aspects of reproductive
technology.242
What accounts for this longstanding legal vacuum is a matter of some
speculation. One theory for the absence of federal legislation is that
reproductive technology lies outside the purview of what Congress may
regulate.243 Another is that no consensus exists at the national level on what
form the regulation should assume.244 At the state level, where we would
expect regulation of the medical profession to originate, self-regulation of the
infertility industry is also the prevailing norm. One possible roadblock to
regulation is the battle over abortion that continues to rage in the United
States in ways that seem incomprehensible in Europe. Since the regulation of
assisted reproduction invariably brings up questions of the status of the
embryo,245 politicians are loathe to become involved with this issue for fear
of alienating certain constituencies.246 Even in states where anti-abortion
sentiments are strong, it is possible that assisted reproduction, a technology
aimed at helping people have children, is so bound up with notions of
reproductive freedom and privacy that many would be uncomfortable asking
the government to dictate how it can and cannot be used.247
Despite the hesitancy of politicians to advance legislation in this area, the
regulation of assisted reproduction is a popular wedge issue employed by
those opposed to abortion who have less interest in reproductive technology
per se than they have in advancing the position that embryos should be
241. Id. at 433.
242. Deborah Spar, Reproductive Tourism and the Regulatory Map, 352 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 531, 532 (2005).
243. Ouelette et al., supra note 237, at 433 (“Sovereignty complications also arise,
with some issues requiring attention on the state level.”); Robert L. Stenger, The Law of
Assisted Reproduction in the United Kingdom and the United States, 9 J.L. & HEALTH 135,
138 (1994–95); Howard W. Jones, Jr., The Status of Regulation of Assisted Reproductive
Technology in the United States, 10 J. ASSISTED REPROD. & GENETICS 331, 331 (1993).
244. Michelle N. Meyer, The Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government, States’
Regulation of Assisted Reproductive Technologies: What Does the U.S. Constitution Allow?,
at 14 (2009), available at http://www.rockinst.org/pdf/health_care/2009-07- States_
Regulation_ART.pdf.
245. NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES: LEGAL
POLARIZATION AND THE CREATION OF CULTURE 186 (2010).
246. Alan Zarembo, Fertility: A Very Private Practice, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2009, at 1
(referring to the “minefield of reproductive rights” triggered by the topic of governmental
regulation of assisted reproduction).
247. Ouelette et al., supra note 237, at 433.
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regarded as human beings.248 Wedge-issue politics using ART regulation as a
cover has met with some success in the area of embryo disposition (called
“adoption” in this context) and embryonic stem cell research. New attempts
are being made to advance an anti-abortion agenda through the issues of sex
selection, the safety of egg donors, and the well-being of donor-conceived
children.249 These efforts will not lead to anything resembling comprehensive
legislation but, assuming success, will only exacerbate the problem of
idiosyncratic and inconsistent legislation at the state level.
In addition to the political fallout that might attend an attempt to regulate
assisted reproductive techniques is the fact that the infertility industry itself
disfavors governmental regulation of its activities.250 This may be a valid
fear, given the example of Italy, whose regulation has wreaked havoc on the
ability of infertility physicians to help their patients and was partially struck
down for its micromanagement of the physician-patient relationship.251 The
Italian Constitutional Court objected that the law rendered clinical judgment
practically irrelevant in the treatment of patients despite the individualized
circumstances different patients invariably present. The situation in the
United States, though, is hardly akin to pre-2004 Italy, at least politically
speaking. It is true that women’s groups are no more unified here than they
were in Italy,252 but the prevailing religious winds in the United States,
unlike those in Catholic Italy, are Protestant. While the influence of the
Roman Catholic Church has inculcated in many Europeans the belief in
“unconditional human dignity,” the Protestant ethic of the United States
emphasizes individual responsibility.253 This attitudinal disparity may
248. Jennifer L. Rosato, The Children of ART (Assisted Reproductive Technology):
Should the Law Protect Them from Harm?, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 57, 74 (2004).
249. Mara Hvistendahl, Blaming Abortion for Disappearing Girls, SALON, Jun. 30,
2011,
available
at
http://www.salon.com/life/feature/2011/06/30/abortion_sex_
selection_debate; Richard F. Storrow, Eggsploitation and Abortion Politics, FEMINIST LAW
PROFESSORS, Aug. 6, 2010, available at http://www.feministlawprofessors.com/2010/08/
eggsloitation-abortion-politics/; Eric Blyth & Wendy Kramer, ‘My Daddy’s Name is Donor’:
Read with Caution!, BIONEWS, Jul. 10, 2010, available at http://www.bionews.org.uk
/page_65970.asp.
250. Ouelette et al., supra note 237, at 433; Keye, Jr., et al., supra note 237, at 536
(noting that a majority of infertility clinics oppose governmental regulation but do not resist
self-policing by the profession).
251. Benagiano & Gianaroli, supra note 198.
252. NAOMI CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES: WHY THE FERTILITY MARKET NEEDS LEGAL
REGULATION 5–7 (2009); Richard F. Storrow, Quests for Conception: Fertility Tourists,
Globalization and Feminist Legal Theory, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 295, 308 (2006).
253. Scott Sayare, In Europe, a Chorus of Outrage over a U.S. Execution, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 23, 2011, at A13.
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explain to some degree why Protestants, some strands of which are
admittedly vehemently opposed to abortion, are not as a group opposed to
assisted reproduction.254 No Donum Vitae or analogous document exhorts
members of any Protestant denomination to refrain from resorting to medical
science for the purposes of procreation. Although there have been attempts in
some state legislatures to bar certain classes of people from having access to
assisted reproduction, there has to date been no concerted effort, as was the
case in Italy, to ban certain techniques altogether.
If there is any future movement toward a comprehensive legislative
scheme governing ART in the United States, doctors will likely be the
primary movers of policy as they were in Spain. As Varone et al. observe,
the medical profession is organized and has a vested interest in policy
development and so, armed as they are with specialized knowledge, are the
first group of actors to whom the state will turn to ask for participation in the
development of biotechnology policies or “are likely to be the first to turn to
state actors to demand such policies.”255 In some cases, the medical
profession may advance “self-regulation as a strategy of influencing and
possibly preventing future state intervention.”256 Thereafter ensconced as
“‘private interest governments,’” the medical profession may be “powerful
enough to resist any policy change demanded by emerging groups” such as
patients, the church, and women.257 Indeed, such emerging groups,
specifically because they lack specialized technical knowledge “will often
suffer from insufficient credibility to encourage policy change.”258
With the abortion wars raging and an infertility industry content to
operate free of any governmental regulation, legislative regulation of the
infertility industry, at least in the United States, remains little more than an
academic topic of conversation and will likely remain one well into the
future. If anything, the United States will see nothing more than issuespecific legal regulation of assisted reproduction.259 In this way, it will
continue to be an outlier among nations that also have highly developed
infertility industries.
254. Howard Jones & Jean Cohen, IFFS Surveillance 07, Preface (2007), 87
FERTILITY & STERILITY Sup. 1, S5 (2007), http://www.iffs-reproduction.org/documents
/Surveillance_07.pdf (“[M]any religious organizations of various persuasions, as well as a
large segment of the population, take the position that the developing human conceptus does
not deserve protection by society during early development.”).
255. THE POLITICS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 49, at 11.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 11, 12
258. Id. at 12.
259. Rosato, supra note 248, at 74; Stenger, supra note 243, at 137–38.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The story of the legal regulation of assisted reproduction in Spain and
Italy is the story of which interest group—the medical community, the
Roman Catholic Church, or feminists—most effectively influenced
legislators. Physicians in Spain in the early 1980s desired that Spain embrace
assisted reproductive technology and join a group of countries committed to
scientific advancement. This commitment to being at the forefront of
scientific achievement resulted in a permissive law that would have been
impossible to achieve just a little over ten years earlier in Franco-controlled
Spain, even if IVF technology had been possible at that time. Feminist
groups and the Church were impotent to challenge this dominant discourse
because either, in the case of feminists, they assumed uninformed and
contradictory stances toward the technology, or, in the case of the Church,
were marginalized by a political system with too vivid a memory of the close
connection with Franco the Church had pursued and exploited during the
long decades of authoritarian rule.
In Italy, the influence of physicians and the Church took a divergent
course. Just as in post-Franco Spain, the Catholic Church’s influence over
law and policy had waned during the turbulent 1970s and 1980s when social
changes in many forms had swept across Italy. But in contrast to Spain, the
fractured political party system and differences of opinion among physicians
and feminists about the proper regulatory course meant that years would be
spent in a legal vacuum that encouraged Italy to become a venue for any and
all forms of assisted reproduction. Once a more united government entered
power and the opposition refused to take a stand against restrictions on
reproduction, the stage was set for the reemergence of the Church as a potent
political force. Although the Church stopped short of suggesting that the
tenets of Donum Vitae should become the law of the land, it was powerful
and influential enough to persuade the government to enact the most
restrictive set of regulations on assisted reproduction ever seen in Europe.
Neither the Spanish nor the Italian approach to assisted reproduction is
likely to change anytime soon. Constitutional challenges to the Spanish law
failed in the 1990s, and although Italy’s Constitutional Court struck down the
limitation on the number of embryos that could be created in any one IVF
cycle, it does not follow that it will rule that the prohibition on egg, sperm
and embryo donation is unconstitutional on either equality or liberty grounds.
Indeed, the Court was emboldened by S.H. v. Austria simply to remand cases
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to lower courts that had declared the prohibition unconstitutional.260 This
may suggest that the European Court of Human Rights, which decided S.H.,
will prefer to remain deferential to the positions national legislatures adopt
on assisted reproduction. However, the Court has declared admissible a case
brought to challenge the anti-PGD provisions of the Italian law as a violation
of the right to private life and the anti-discrimination provisions of the
European Convention on Human Rights.261
A critical lesson to be drawn from this examination of the regulation of
assisted reproduction in two Catholic countries is that those who introduce
legislation and maintain control of the narrative are likely to see their
positions become law. Once legislation is enacted, it tends to be difficult to
repeal or alter in the absence of some dramatic change in attitudes or
opinions. This leaves those who disagree with the state of the law on ART
with little hope of dismantling those legislative regimes in the short term.
A country like the United States, with virtually no regulation, might
appear to be fertile ground for a group hoping to influence the direction of
ART policy. In fact, however, the kind of process that led to legislation in
Spain and Italy, where a dominant group with a consistent message
controlled the legislative process from introduction to enactment, has already
occurred in the United States. Unlike in Spain and Italy, where the
controlling group desired legislation, however, the American infertility
industry is opposed. That is why, in the final analysis, the state of regulation
in the United States has much more in common with Spain than it does with
Italy. For better or worse, physicians have already set and will continue to set
the policy that prevails in the United States today.
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